

## Message Text

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TEL AVIV, AMMAN, JIDDA, DAMASCUS,  
BEIRUT

FROM ATHERTON, U.S. DEL NO. 33

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PEPR EG US  
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KAMEL--JANUARY 31

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: EILTS AND I MET FOR TWO HOURS  
MORNING JANUARY 31 WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KAMEL. IN A  
FRIENDLY AND LOW-KEY WAY KAMEL GOT ACROSS MESSAGE THAT  
SADAT IS DISAPPOINTED THAT THE U.S. HAS NOT PLAYED A  
"STRONGER ROLE" AND THAT THERE IS EVEN MUCH QUESTIONING  
IN EGYPT OF THE UTILITY OF THE AMERICAN CONNECTION AND  
EGYPT'S PURSUING THE PEACE TALKS. AT SAME TIME KAMEL  
MADE CLEAR THAT SADAT CONTINUES TO HAVE THE HIGHEST REGARD  
FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY AND WANTS TO CON-  
TINUE TO WORK WITH THE U.S. AND TO GO ON WITH THE PEACE  
EFFORT. WITHOUT MENTIONING THE F-16'S KAMEL EXPRESSED  
CONCERN OVER U.S. SUPPLY OF ARMS FOR ISRAEL AND OVER  
FACT ISRAEL CONTINUES ITS SETTLEMENTS POLICY DESPITE  
U.S. CONDEMNATION. KAMEL STRESSED THAT EGYPT VERY MUCH  
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WANTS A PEACE SETTLEMENT BUT IT CANNOT BE BILATERAL; IT  
MUST INCLUDE JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS (HE DID NOT  
MENTION SYRIA) AND HAVE SAUDI SUPPORT. WHILE KAMEL AT  
FIRST SAID EGYPTIANS WANT TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER SADAT'S  
VISIT TO WASHINGTON BEFORE DISCUSSING FURTHER DRAFT  
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, AT MY URGING HE AGREED TO  
OUR REVIEWING THE LATEST DRAFT AND I WENT OVER IT WITH

HIM. KAMEL INDICATED THERE ARE STILL IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES TO BE OVERCOME BUT HE MADE NO SPECIFIC COMMENT ON THE DRAFT. I PRESSED HIM TO GIVE ME COMMENTS WHEN WE MEET FEBRUARY 1 AND HE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE BUT I AM NOT SURE HE WILL HAVE MUCH FOR ME THEN. KAMEL DID HOWEVER GIVE THE DEFINITE IMPRESSION THAT EGYPT IS EAGER TO HAVE A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND WANTS TO PURSUE EFFORTS ON IT THROUGH INTERMEDIARY OF THE U.S. FOLLOWING SADAT'S VISIT TO CAMP DAVID. HE SAID ONCE DECLARATION IS ACHIEVED, EGYPT WILL BE READY TO RESUME FORMAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETINGS. END SUMMARY.

2. AFTER BEING WELCOMED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER, I SAID THAT I HAVE BEEN TELLING THE PRESS THAT MY VISIT TO CAIRO IS SOLELY FOR INFORMAL AND EXPLORATORY TALKS. EILTS NOTED THAT THIS WAS IN LINE WITH WHAT KAMEL HAD SAID WHEN AGREEMENT TO MY VISIT HAD BEEN GIVEN, I.E., THAT I WOULD BE COMING ON AN INFORMAL BASIS. I SAID I SIMPLY WANTED TO ATTEMPT TO EXPLORE WAYS IN WHICH WORK ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES CAN GO FORWARD, AND I WOULD WELCOME ANY THOUGHTS THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD ON HOW THE NEOGITATIONS SHOULD PROCEED.

3. KAMEL SAID FIRST HE WOULD LIKE TO GIVE US A VERY CANDID ACCOUNT OF HOW PRESIDENT SADAT AND PEOPLE WHO REPRESENT PUBLIC OPINION IN EGYPT FEEL AT THIS MOMENT.

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REFERRING FREQUENTLY TO WRITTEN NOTES, KAMEL SAID SADAT FEELS "VERY EMBARRASSED" ABOUT THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE ISRAELIS IN JERUSALEM. HE EXPLAINED THAT EGYPTIAN DELEGATION HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM THE JERUSALEM TALKS BECAUSE SADAT FELT THAT THE TALKS WERE NOT LEADING TO ANYTHING POSITIVE, THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR EXPECTING PROGRESS. KAMEL SAID PRESIDENT SADAT FEELS THE U.S. SHOULD TAKE A MUCH STRONGER ROLE IN PROMOTING AGREEMENT. SADAT HAS PUT ALL HIS TRUST IN THE U.S. BECAUSE HE LIKES AMERICANS AND HAS WARM FEELINGS TOWARD PRESIDENT CARTER AND SECRETARY VANCE. HE FEELS THAT THE U.S. IS THE ONLY POWER THAT CAN PUSH ISRAEL TOWARD A MORE FLEXIBLE POSITION. KAMEL SAID SADAT HAD EXPECTED MORE FROM THE U.S. IT IS NOT SADAT'S MANNER TO SPEAK LOUDLY OR SEEM TO BE PUTTING PRESSURE ON ANYONE, BUT HE DOES FEEL THAT THE U.S. HAS NOT UNDERSTOOD HIS "HINTS" AND HAS NOT TAKEN A STRONG ENOUGH POSITION. KAMEL SAID WHEN THE ISRAELIS WANT TO MAKE A POINT THEY TAKE A VERY TOUGH POSITION. EGYPT'S APPROACH IS DIFFERENT; WHEN EGYPTIANS PUT MATTERS IN A CLEAR WAY, THEY FEEL THEIR VIEWS SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD.

4. KAMEL SAID HE HAD MET WITH THE PARLIAMENTARY ARAB, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND SECURITY COMMITTEES FOR ALMOST FOUR HOURS AND HAD FACED DIFFICULT QUESTIONS. HE WANTED TO GIVE ME SOME OF THE FLAVOR OF THAT MEETING. REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL THE PARTIES AND FACTIONS WERE THERE, KAMEL SAID, AND FROM THE QUESTIONS ASKED IT WAS CLEAR THAT EVERYBODY FELT THAT THE U.S. POSITION

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WAS NOT AT ALL WHAT EGYPT HAD HOPED FOR. KAMEL SAID HE WAS REPEATEDLY QUESTIONED AS TO WHY EGYPT SHOULD CONTINUE TALKS IN THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE WHEN ISRAEL MAINTAINED THE POSITION OF NO RETURN TO THE BORDERS OF 1967 AND NO RIGHTS FOR THE PALESTINIANS. THE KEY MEMBERS FELT IT WOULD BE USELESS TO CARRY ON IF THE AMERICANS ARE NOT GOING TO BE VERY TOUGH WITH ISRAEL. MANY ALSO QUESTIONED THE UTILITY OF EGYPT'S SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. AND FELT THAT MOVES SHOULD BE MADE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. KAMEL SAID HE WAS REPEATEDLY ASKED WHY EGYPT SHOULD CONTINUE TO RELY SOLELY ON THE AMERICANS. KAMEL SAID THESE VIEWS WERE EXPRESSED BY MODERATE MEMBERS OF THE PARLIAMENT, BUT OF COURSE THE LEFTISTS ARE DOING EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO EXPLOIT PEOPLES CONCERNS AND TO TRY TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND EGYPT. KAMEL SAID THAT CONCERN HAD ALSO BEEN EXPRESSED OVER THE AMERICAN POSITION ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, AND HE ADDED THAT EGYPT WOULD

LIKE TO SEE U.S. BE MORE FORTHCOMING ON THIS PROBLEM.

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5. KAMEL SAID THE QUESTION OF U.S. ARMS SUPPLY TO ISRAEL HAD ALSO BEEN RAISED IN HIS MEETING WITH THE COMMITTEES. WHILE HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTION THE F-16'S, HE SAID EGYPTIANS KNOW THAT THE U.S. WANTS TO GIVE ISRAEL A FEELING OF SECURITY, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT AMERICAN ARMS SUPPLIES ARE HARDENING THE ISRAELI POSITION. THE ISRAELIS FEEL THEY CAN STAND UP TO THE U.S. AND RESIST AMERICAN PRESSURE BECAUSE THEY HAVE SO MANY ARMS. ALSO, THE ISRAELIS FEEL THAT THEY HAVE ARMS SUPERIORITY OVER EGYPT AND BELIEVE THAT EGYPT THEREFORE HAS TO ACCEPT PEACE ON THEIR TERMS.

6. KAMEL SAID PEOPLE IN EGYPT HAD BEEN VERY HAPPY TO SEE THE PRESS STORIES ABOUT PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER TO BEGIN AND HIS CONDEMNATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS. BUT THE EGYPTIANS SEE THAT ISRAEL CONTINUES TO ESTABLISH SETTLEMENTS EVEN THOUGH THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER USG SPOKESMEN REPEATEDLY CONDEMN THEM. KAMEL STRESSED THAT EGYPT VIEWS THE SETTLEMENT PROBLEM AS A VERY SERIOUS ONE. IF THE ISRAELIS CONTINUE THEIR POLICY IN SPITE OF WARNINGS FROM THE U.S. AND WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE GOING ON, THEN KAMEL SAID HE DID NOT KNOW HOW PROGRESS COULD BE MADE.

7. KAMEL SAID AS WE KNOW EGYPT HAS ASKED THE EUROPEANS TO TAKE STEPS TO BE HELPFUL IN MOVING THE NEGOTIATIONS ALONG AND, IN PARTICULAR, TO ISSUE A STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST. HE INDICATED THAT EGYPTIANS ARE UNHAPPY THAT THE U.S. HAS DISCOURAGED EUROPEANS FROM DOING SO. (I DID NOT CHALLENGE THIS PENDING CONFIRMATION WE ARE NOT RPT NOT NOW DISCOURAGING EUROPEANS. HAVING RECEIVED DEPARTMENT'S PROMPT AND HELPFUL REPLY IN STATE 25103, I WILL SET RECORD STRAIGHT TOMORROW.) EGYPT DOES NOT WANT  
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TO DETRACT FROM THE AMERICAN ROLE, BUT IT FEELS THE EUROPEANS CAN BE HELPFUL AND THAT THEY HAVE AN INTEREST IN PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE SAID OF COURSE ISRAEL WANTS THE EUROPEANS TO KEEP QUIET AND STAY OUT OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM, BUT EGYPT FEELS IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL FOR THEM TO SPEAK UP. KAMEL SAID HE ALSO UNDERSTOOD THE U.S. HAD APPROACHED INDIA TO URGE IT TO

NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. HE DID NOT THINK THIS THE RIGHT TIME FOR SUCH A STEP. ONCE PEACE IS ESTABLISHED EGYPT WILL HAVE NOTHING AGAINST INDIA, THE AFRICANS AND OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING ARAB COUNTRIES, HAVING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL BUT SUCH ACTION IS NOT APPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME. EGYPT WOULD OPPOSE INDIA AND ISRAEL ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AS LONG AS THERE IS NO PEACE.

8. KAMEL REFERRED TO BEGIN'S STATEMENTS ABOUT ANTI-SEMITIC SLURS IN THE EGYPTIAN PRESS. HE SAID THESE ACCUSATIONS ARE TOTALLY UNFOUNDED. EVERYBODY KNOWS HOW TOLERANT THE EGYPTIANS ARE. MUSLIMS, CHRISTIANS AND JEWS HAVE ALWAYS LIVED TOGETHER WITH MUTUAL RESPECT IN EGYPT. KAMEL SAID BEGIN'S CHARGES ARE "NOT AT ALL FAIR AND NOT MORAL."

9. KAMEL SAID HE HOPED I UNDERSTOOD HE WAS MAKING THESE POINTS IN THE SPIRIT OF CANDOR AND FRIENDSHIP THAT CHARACTERIZE RELATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE UNITED STATES. HE WANTED TO REITERATE THAT EGYPT IS VERY KEEN ON A PEACE SETTLEMENT AND COUNTS ON THE U.S. TO CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO THIS END. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT EGYPT CANNOT GO TO A SETTLEMENT ALONE WITH ISRAEL; SUCH AN ACTION WOULD CREATE GREAT INSTABILITY IN THE ARAB WORLD AND WOULD NOT BRING PEACE. KAMEL REITERATED THAT A BILATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL IS EXCLUDED; "WE DO NOT WANT IT AT ALL." HE SAID IT WOULD BE VERY SHORTSIGHTED OF ISRAEL TO  
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THINK THAT THEY CAN SEPARATE EGYPT FROM THE OTHER

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ARABS AND THEREBY ASSURE THEMSELVES OF MILITARY SUPERIORITY. WITHOUT A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT INVOLVING JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS THERE CAN BE NO PEACE. I POINTED OUT THAT A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT IS OUR OBJECTIVE AS WELL. ISRAEL ALSO TAKES THIS VIEW. I SAID DAYAN HAD EMPHASIZED MANY TIMES THAT THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE IT CREATES A FRAMEWORK FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

9. KAMEL SAID THE ESSENTIAL IS THAT THE JORDANIANS JOIN IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THAT THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION BE DEALT WITH, AND THAT THERE BE SAUDI SUPPORT FOR THE PROCESS. IF THIS TAKES PLACE, EGYPT CAN "PULL THE CARPET OUT FROM UNDER THE REJECTIONISTS;" OTHERWISE, KAMEL SAID, I DO NOT SEE WHAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED. KAMEL REFERRED TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ACTIONS IN 1956-57 IN OBLIGING THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW FROM SINAI. WHY, HE ASKED, COULD NOT PRESIDENT CARTER DO WHAT PRESIDENT EISENHOWER DID THEN? KAMEL ADDED IMMEDIATELY THAT HE  
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OF COURSE UNDERSTOOD OUR DIFFICULTIES, BUT HE SAID THAT IF THINGS DRAG ON MUCH LONGER HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN.

10. HAVING LISTENED TO KAMEL'S PRESENTATION ALMOST WITHOUT INTERRUPTING, I SAID I WOULD NOW LIKE TO ASK A FEW QUESTIONS AND MAKE SOME COMMENTS. MY FIRST WOULD BE CONCERNING KAMEL'S STATEMENT THAT SADAT IS DISAPPOINTED IN THE U.S. POSITION. KAMEL INTERJECTED THAT EGYPT IS VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE AMERICAN ROLE. HE WANTED TO STRESS THIS POINT AND TO SAY THAT EGYPT COUNTS VERY MUCH ON THE CONTINUATION OF THE AMERICAN ROLE. KAMEL SAID ALL EGYPTIANS ARE VERY APPRECIATIVE OF WHAT THE U.S. HAS DONE AND HOPEFUL FOR FUTURE U.S. ACTIONS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM. I SAID MY QUESTION WAS WHETHER KAMEL'S COMMENT RELATED TO THE ROLE THE U.S. WAS PLAYING IN THE JERUSALEM POLITICAL COMMITTEE OR WAS INTENDED AS A GENERAL OBSERVATION. KAMEL SAID HE

MEANT THE COMMENT MORE GENERALLY. HIS TALKS WITH SECRETARY VANCE HAD BEEN VERY GOOD AND HE HAD FELT THE SECRETARY HAD BEEN RECEPTIVE TO EGYPT'S IDEAS. KAMEL ADDED HOWEVER THAT HE HAD THOUGHT THE SECRETARY WOULD START WITH A STRONGER POSITION TOWARD ISRAEL THAN HE DID. I SAID I THOUGHT A LARGE PART OF THE PROBLEM LIES IN THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE APPROACHES OF THE VARIOUS PARTIES TO THE PROBLEM. EGYPT HAS ITS OWN WAY OF NEGOTIATING, SO DOES ISRAEL AND SO DOES THE U.S. I HOPED PRESIDENT SADAT REALIZES THAT THE SECRETARY MADE A MAJOR EFFORT IN JERUSALEM. BUT TO MAKE PROGRESS, THERE HAVE TO BE GENUINE NEGOTIATIONS. THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THE HANDS OF THOSE IN ISRAEL LIKE DAYAN WHO ARE DOING THEIR BEST TO FIND WAYS TO MOVE FOWARD. IN THIS REGARD, I NOTED THAT DAYAN HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY HELPFUL AND HAS WORKED  
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TO PERSUADE OTHERS IN THE ISRAELI CABINET, INCLUDING BEGIN, TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. AFTER MANY YEARS OF DEALING WITH THE ISRAELIS, I PERSONALLY COULD SEE NO ALTERNATIVE TO GOING THROUGH THE LONG AND DIFFICULT PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION. WHILE IN ISRAEL I HAD SPENT A GREAT DEAL OF TIME TRYING TO EXPLAIN TO THE ISRAELIS WHY EGYPT FEELS AS IT DOES AND TAKES THE POSITIONS IT DOES, AND I THINK MY EFFORTS HAVE HELPED. I SAID I FELT THE OBLIGATION TO DO THE SAME THING IN REVERSE NOW THAT I AM IN EGYPT.

11. KAMEL SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS AND WELCOMED MY EXPLANATION. HOWEVER, KAMEL SA R, WE FEEL THE ISRAELIS ARE TRYING TO SABOTAGE OUR RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS, EVEN THE MODERATE ARABS. KAMEL SAID HE WAS THINKING IN PARTICULAR ABOUT BEGIN'S STATEMENT THAT SADAT HAD TOLD HIM THAT ALL THE PLO WERE SOVIET AGENTS. THIS SORT OF THING IS VERY DAMAGING AND AT THE LEAST REPRESENTS A SERIOUS BREACH OF CONFIDENCE. I SAID AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND I HAD DISCUSSED THIS WITH BEGIN, AND BEGIN HAD EXPLAINED THAT HE DID NOT REALIZE THAT THE PRESS WAS IN THE ROOM WHEN HE MADE THE REMARK--AN EXPLANATION WHICH BOTH LEWIS AND I FELT WAS GENUINE. REGARDING THE EGYPTIAN VIEW THAT ISRAEL HAS NOT RESPONDED IN ADEQUATE MEASURE TO PRESIDENT SADAT'S INITIATIVES, I POINTED OUT THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT PERCEPTION. THEY SEE BEGIN'S OFFER OF FULL WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI AND SELF-RULE FOR THE WEST BANK AS UNPRECEDENTED STEPS. I SAID THAT WHILE I REALIZED THESE ISRAELI POSITIONS DO NOT GO FAR ENOUGH FROM EGYPT'S POINT OF VIEW, EGYPTIANS SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THEY REPRESENT GREAT CONCESSIONS IN ISRAEL'S VIEW.

THERE HAS BEEN MUCH CRITICISM OF BEGIN IN ISRAEL FOR  
GOING TOO FAR TOO FAST. IN PARTICULAR, BEGIN HAS BEEN  
STRONGLY CRITICIZED BY MEMBERS OF HIS OWN PARTY. I  
SAID I DID NOT WANT TO BELABOR THE POINT, BUT IT IS  
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CLEAR THAT THERE IS A REAL COMMUNICATIONS GAP BETWEEN  
THE TWO SIDES.

12. REGARDING KAMEL'S COMMENTS ON U.S. ARMS SUPPLIES  
FOR ISRAEL, I SAID THE LATEST INFORMATION I HAD WAS  
THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD SAID IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE  
YESTERDAY THAT HE HAD NOT MADE ANY DECISION ON WHAT  
WOULD OR WOULD NOT BE SOLD TO ISRAEL OR ON THE TIMING  
OF POSSIBLE SALES. KAMEL SAID HE QUESTIONED THAT THE  
AMERICAN POLICY OF PROVIDING ARMS TO ISRAEL IS HELPFUL  
IN PROMOTING A SETTLEMENT. I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ARGUMENTS  
CAN BE MADE TO SUPPORT BOTH VIEWS BUT SAID I DID NOT  
THINK IT USEFUL TO REHASH THE PAST. THE SITUATION IS  
VERY COMPLICATED AND MOREOVER WE HAVE COMMITMENTS TO  
ISRAEL WHICH WE MADE EARLIER. KAMEL SAID PRESIDENT SADAT



IS "OBSESSED" WITH THE IDEA THAT THE U.S. SHOULD BE PROTECTING ISRAELI SECURITY WITHIN ITS 1967 BORDERS, NOT WITHIN THE OCCUPATION BORDERS. SADAT FEELS THAT THE ARMS ISRAEL GETS FROM THE U.S. HELPS THEM TO HOLD ON TO THE TERRITORIES. KAMEL SAID EGYPT AGREES ISRAEL  
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SHOULD HAVE SECURITY WITHIN ITS 1967 BORDERS, BUT THEY SHOULD NOT EXPLOIT U.S. SUPPORT TO MAINTAIN THEIR OCCUPATION.

13. I SAID I WOULD LIKE TO GET SOME SENSE FROM KAMEL ON HOW HE SEES THE NEGOTIATIONS PROCEEDING FROM HERE. DURING HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SADAT ON THE WAY BACK TO THE U.S. FROM JERUSALEM, THE SECRETARY HAD LEFT WITH SADAT A REVISED VERSION OF THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLE BASED ON OUR OWN THINKING AFTER THE SECRETARY'S FINAL TALK WITH BEGIN. I STRESSED THAT THIS DRAFT DID NOT HAVE ISRAELI APPROVAL; WE HAD NOT EVEN SHOWN IT TO THE ISRAELIS BEFORE THE SECRETARY GAVE IT TO SADAT, ALTHOUGH I HAD SUBSEQUENTLY GIVEN THEM A COPY. IT WAS PURELY AN AMERICAN PAPER. I SAID I WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING KAMEL'S REACTION TO I.

14. KAMEL SAID THEY HAD STUDIED THIS PAPER AND HAD SOME VIEWS, BUT THESE WERE STILL WITH PRESIDENT SADAT, AND HE THOUGHT THAT DISCUSSION OF THIS SHOULD BE LEFT UNTIL AFTER PRESIDENT SADAT'S VISIT TO CAMP DAVID. I SAID WE HAD HAD SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS ON THIS PAPER AND HAD GOTTEN COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES FROM THEM. SOME OF THESE SUGGESTIONS MIGHT NOT BE AGREEABLE TO THE EGYPTIANS BUT I THOUGHT THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD FIND OTHERS HELPFUL AT LEAST TO SOME EXTENT. I SAID I WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE DECLARATION WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN AN ENTIRELY INFORMAL MANNER. THIS WOULD NOT BE A RESUMPTION OF FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS; IT WOULD SIMPLY BE AN EFFORT TO CLARIFY WHERE THINGS STAND. I SAID I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO GET THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S THINKING ON HOW WE CAN MOVE ON TO ITEM 2 OF THE AGENDA, THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE,  
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AND ENCOURAGE HUSSEIN TO COME IN, AND ALSO HOW EGYPT PROPOSES TO DEAL WITH ITEM 3, THE ELEMENTS OF PEACE, WHICH I UNDERSTOOD PRESIDENT SADAT VIEWS AS VERY IMPORTANT.

15. REFLECTING FOR A MOMENT, KAMEL SAID HE AGREED THAT I FILL HIM IN ON THE ISRAELI REACTION TO THE DRAFT. I THEN GAVE KAMEL A COPY OF THE JANUARY 20 DRAFT WHICH THE SECRETARY HAD LEFT WITH SADAT. I SAID DAYAN HAD EMPHASIZED IN OUR TALKS HIS COMMITMENT TO TRY TO GET AN ACCEPTABLE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. I TOLD KAMEL ABOUT THE GESTURE DAYAN HAD MADE IN VOLUNTEERING USE OF THE TERM "WEST BANK" INSTEAD OF "JUDEA AND SAMARIA" IN THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH TEXT ONCE AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON A DECLARATION. I ALSO POINTED OUT IT WAS DAYAN'S SUGGESTION TO PUT IN PARAGRAPH 3 WHICH IN OUR FORMULATION CALLS FOR A "JUST SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM", ALTHOUGH I NOTED THAT THE ISRAELIS PREFERRED THE TERM "PROBLEM OF THE PALESTINIAN ARABS". I EXPLAINED THAT DAYAN HAD WANTED TO OFFER OVERALL LANGUAGE ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE EGYPTIANS. I THEN WENT DOWN THE TEXT PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH AND GAVE KAMEL A COPY OF THE JANUARY 24 DRAFT, EXPLAINING ISRAELI-PROPOSED CHANGES AND GIVING THE RATIONALE FOR THEM. I POINTED OUT THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD AGREED TO MY SUGGESTION ON THE USE OF THE WORD "RIGHT" IN PARAGRAPH 4A OF THE LATEST DRAFT IN THE HOPE THAT THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL. I SAID I HAD BROUGHT THIS UP WITH DAYAN AND THAT HE HAD GOTTEN BEGIN'S SPECIFIC AGREEMENT TO IT. I THOUGHT THE MINISTER SHOULD KNOW THE BACKGROUND AND SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE EFFORT MADE BY THE ISRAELIS IN THIS REGARD. I SAID I HAD MADE CLEAR IN MY TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS THAT I WAS NOT GOING TO CAIRO WITH A JOINT U.S./ISRAELI PAPER. I UNDERTOOK TO TRY TO PRESENT ISRAELI VIEWS FAITHFULLY TO THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT, BUT IT HAD TO BE UNDERSTOOD

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THAT WE WERE NOT ENDORSING THESE VIEWS.

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16. KAMEL SAID IT WAS CLEAR THERE ARE STILL IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES TO BE OVERCOME, BUT HE DID NOT COMMENT ON ANY SPECIFIC POINT OF THE DRAFT OR THE ISRAELI CHANGES. HE SAID HE WOULD STUDY IT. KAMEL THEN ASKED IF I HAD SHOWN THE DRAFT TO HUSSEIN. I SAID I HAD NOT. I HAD DESCRIBED IT TO HUSSEIN IN GENERAL TERMS AND I THINK HE HAS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE BROAD OUTLINES AND OF THE PROBLEMS, BUT I DID NOT SHOW IT OR READ IT TO HIM. I THOUGHT HUSSEIN HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT ENCOURAGED BY THE WORK THAT HAD BEEN DONE. HE HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ONLY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE WAS CONTINUING ITS WORK AND HAD FEARED THAT IMPLIED THAT EGYPT AND ISRAEL WERE WORKING TOWARD A BILATERAL AGREEMENT. I SAID I HAD TOLD HUSSEIN THAT SUCH IS NOT REPEAT NOT SADAT'S INTENTION AND THAT EGYPT IS DEDICATED TO GETTING A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. KAMEL SAID THERE HAD BEEN CONCERN IN EGYPT ALSO THAT THE FACT THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TALKS ARE CONTINUING GIVES THE IMPRESSION THAT EGYPT AND ISRAEL ARE WORKING ON A BILATERAL ARRANGEMENT. I POINTED OUT THIS MAKES IT ALL THE MORE  
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IMPORTANT THAT  
WE CONTINUE THE POLITICAL TALKS AND WORK  
ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AT LEAST IN AN INFORMAL  
WAY.

17. KAMEL ASKED ABOUT HUSSEIN'S ATTITUDE ABOUT JOINING THE NEGOTIATIONS. I SAID I THOUGHT HUSSEIN HAD AN OPEN MIND ON THIS, BUT HE HAD NOT COMMITTED HIMSELF. HE WANTS TO SEE THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES FIRST AND TO KNOW WHAT IT WILL MEAN. HE IS INCLINED TO JOIN, BUT HE DOES NOT WANT TO MAKE A COMMITMENT UNTIL HE HAS THE DECLARATION IN HAND AND HAS THE ASSURANCE THAT IT WILL BE TRANSLATED INTO NEW ARRANGEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK. KAMEL PRESSED TO KNOW HUSSEIN'S VIEWS ON DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND PARTICULARLY WHETHER HUSSEIN FOUND

PRESIDENT CARTER'S ASWAN STATEMENT SUFFICIENT. I SAID HUSSEIN HAD NOT TAKEN A CATEGORICAL POSITION IN THIS RESPECT; HIS DECISION WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE INFLUENCED NOT ONLY BY THE LANGUAGE OF THE DECLARATION BUT BY THE ASSURANCES HE RECEIVED FROM EGYPT AND THE U.S. I POINTED OUT THAT, AT THE END OF OUR MEETING, HUSSEIN HAD AUTHORIZED RELEASE OF A STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. EFFORTS, WHICH WAS INTERPRETED AS SUPPORT FOR EGYPTIAN EFFORTS AND SADAT'S INITIATIVE. THIS HAD IMMEDIATELY EARNED HIM SYRIAN CRITICISM. KAMEL AGAIN ASKED WHAT I THOUGHT PROSPECTS WERE FOR HUSSEIN'S JOINING THE TALKS AND I REITERATED THAT I DID NOT THINK HE WOULD MAKE A DECISION ON THE BASIS OF THE DECLARATION ALONE; MUCH WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER PALESTINIANS PARTICIPATE TOO, AND ALSO ON THE EFFORT THAT THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT MAKES TO PERSUADE HIM TO JOIN.

18. I AGAIN SAID I HOPED KAMEL WOULD STUDY THE DRAFT DECLARATION AND THAT HE WOULD GIVE ME HIS COMMENTS

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AND REACTIONS IN AN INFORMAL, NON-BINDING WAY TOMORROW. KAMEL SAID HE WOULD LOOK AT THE PAPER. HE INDICATED THAT IN PRINCIPLE HE WOULD BE AGREEABLE TO DISCUSSING IT WITH ME TOMORROW, BUT HE AGAIN MENTIONED THAT THE TIME FOR SERIOUS WORK ON THE DECLARATION WOULD BE AFTER PRESIDENT SADAT'S TRIP TO CAMP DAVID. KAMEL SAID HE FELT IT VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE U.S. CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS UNTIL A DECLARATION IS ACHIEVED. HE HOPED WE WOULD PURSUE OUR CONSULTATIONS IN CAIRO AND JERUSALEM IN AN EFFORT TO MOVE THE PARTIES NEARER TO AGREEMENT. HE SAW NEGOTIATIONS ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES CONTINUING IN THIS MANNER, WITH RESUMPTION OF THE FORMAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETINGS COMING AFTER A DECLARATION HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. KAMEL SAID THE MILITARY COMMITTEE CAN CONTINUE ITS DELIBERATIONS BUT SHOULD DO SO IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION TO OTHER ARABS THAT EGYPT IS WORKING ON A BILATERAL DEAL WITH ISRAEL.

19. IN CLOSING, KAMEL STRESSED THAT THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES IS COMMON GOAL OF ALL AND THAT UNTIL IT IS ACHIEVED, EGYPT WANTS TO CONTINUE TO WORK THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF THE U.S., AND NOT TO GO BACK TO THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE. HOWEVER, KAMEL REITERATED, ONCE THE DECLARATION IS AGREED UPON EGYPT WOULD BE READY TO RESUME THE FORMAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETINGS, THOUGH OF COURSE THE SITE AND TIMING WILL HAVE TO BE AGREED UPON. I SAID WHILE THE ISRAELIS WOULD LIKE THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE TALKS TO RECONVENE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, I THOUGHT DAYAN UNDERSTOOD THE DIFFICULTIES

FOR THE EGYPTIANS AND WAS PREPARED TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATING  
THE DECLARATION THROUGH U.S. GOOD OFFICES. I ADDED THAT  
AT SOME POINT I WOULD LIKE TO GET THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S  
THOUGHTS ON THE SITE AND THE FORMAT FOR RECONVENING THE  
POLITICAL COMMITTEE AND TO BEGIN TO TALK ABOUT ITEMS 2  
AND 3 OF THE AGENDA. I POINTED OUT THAT EVEN IF HUSSEIN  
DID NOT JOIN THE TALKS IMMEDIATELY, IT WOULD BE VERY  
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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----108578 010009Z /65  
O 312221Z JAN 78  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4984

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NODIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TEL AVIV, AMMAN, JIDDA, DAMASCUS  
BEIRUT

USEFUL TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE;  
SUCH TALKS COULD HELP HUSSEIN IN REACHING A  
DECISION TO JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

20. AS THE MEETING CONCLUDED, KAMEL'S CHEF DE CABINET  
MAHER, WHO SERVED AS NOTETAKER, PRODUCED A STATEMENT,  
WHICH HAD BEEN DRAFTED BEFORE WE BEGAN, FOR USE BY KAMEL  
WITH THE PRESS AS WE WENT OUT. STATEMENT CHARACTERIZED  
THE ISRAELI POSITIONS THAT I HAD REPORTED TO KAMEL AS  
BEING STILL "FAR FROM THE BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF PEACE".  
AT MY SUGGESTION, AND REALLY WITHOUT URGING ON MY PART,  
KAMEL AGREED TO STRIKE THIS LANGUAGE AND TO REPLACE IT

BY WORDS TO THE EFFECT THAT "THERE IS STILL CONSIDERABLE  
WORK TO BE DONE."

21. DURING COURSE OF THIS MEETING KAMEL PHONED SADAT  
AND MADE ARRANGEMENT FOR EILTS AND ME TO CALL ON SADAT  
TOMORROW. NO TIME HAS YET BEEN SET EITHER FOR THE  
CALL ON SADAT OR FOR THE SECOND MEETING WITH KAMEL, BUT  
WE EXPECT THE MEETING WITH KAMEL WILL PRECEED THE CALL  
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ON SADAT. AS NOTED CAIRO 03499, THE EGYPTIANS AT THIS  
POINT ARE STILL SAYING THEY WANT THE CALL ON SADAT KEPT  
OUT OF THE PRESS. THEREFORE WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT  
TO GIVE IT OUT.

22. ANY FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FOR MY MEETINGS WEDNESDAY  
WITH SADAT AND KAMEL SHOULD REACH US BY 0900 CAIRO TIME.  
EILTS

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

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**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, TEXT, MINISTERIAL MEETINGS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, MEETING PROCEEDINGS, CAT-B  
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**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 31 jan 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
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**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
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**Status:** NATIVE  
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**TAGS:** PEPR, EG, IS, XF, (ELITS, HERMANN F)  
**To:** STATE SS MULTIPLE  
**Type:** TE  
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**Review Markings:**  
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US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
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